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RESUMEN
Este artículo documenta e interpreta el comercio español en algodón
americano que se desarrolló entre los años 1740 y 1790. Siguiendo un aná-
lisis historiográfico concerniente a este comercio, aporta datos sobre la can-
tidad importada, el Estado, con o sin pepita, en que se introducía, sus orí-
genes en el imperio americano, las medidas para su transporte marítimo,
sus costes de flete y los precios pagados en España. Muestra que el creci-
miento de este comercio está relacionado con un incremento en la deman-
da para el algodón en rama durante los primeras etapas de la industrializa-
ción catalana cuya satisfacción fue facilitada por las reformas introducidas
en el sistema colonial hispánico.
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The spanish trade in american cotton: atlantic
synergies in the Age of Enlightenment
ABSTRACT
This article documents and interprets the Spanish trade in American
cotton which developed between the 1740s and 1790s. Following an analy-
sis of the historiography concerning the trade, it provides data on the quan-
tities imported, the state, ginned or unginned, in which it was imported, its
origins in the American empire, the shipping arrangements made for its
transport, the charges for its freight and the prices which were paid for it in
Spain. It shows the growth of the trade to be related to growing demand for
raw cotton during the early stages of Catalan industrialization, the meeting
of which was facilitated by the reforms introduced in the Hispanic colonial
system.
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«El algodón brota del suelo por su propia voluntad» (Intendant of
Caracas, 4 April 1777) 1
«sintiendo el desperdicio del algodón de que abunda la América, que
en opinión de muchos es inútil, he experimentado el desvelo con el
que ha hecho venir el que es de la más excelente calidad y aptitud
para hilarse y tejerse con la delicadeza de la mas fina Holanda y
Mosulina» (Jaime Campins, founder of the Royal Manufacture of
Mataró, 1747) 2
«si ... se facilita, y logra el que venga abundancia de algodón en rama
de las Américas, con la convenencia de fletes necesarias para que
estas Fabricas puedan tenerlo a moderados precios, aunque vengan
muchos millares de quintales, no faltarán con el tiempo manos que la
hilen» (Informe de la Junta Particular de Comercio of Barcelona, 26
September 1775) 3
«la història del cotó colonial com a matèria prima per l’indústria de
les indianes està plena de dificultats i la fibra procedent d’America va
tardar molt de temps a tenir expedit el seu camí fins a la indústria
metropolitana», J. M. Oliva Melgar (1986, p. 167).
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1. INTRODUCTION
The growth of a Spanish trade in American cotton in the late 18th cen-
tury played an important part in the early industrialization of the Catalan
cotton industry. It also supplies a significant example of the adaptation of
Spain’s American empire from serving, principally, as a source for pre-
cious metals to supplying tropical commodities in a context of greater eco-
nomic integration with the metropolitan economy. It has not, however,
attracted much attention from historians. It is barely touched upon in a
penetrating study which Antonio García Baquero González (2003, pp. 59-
102) published on the changing make up of the American import trade and
is not mentioned in an article by Josep Maria Delgado (1992, pp. 38-61) on
the Barcelona market for tropical agricultural products at the end of the
18th century. It has been considered, true, in the context of studies of the
Catalan calico-printing industry, but the predominating line in interpreta-
tions here has been that of a failure of the American product in the face of
competition from the Mediterranean, primarily Maltese, cotton yarn
which had supplied this industry since its inception. While an acceleration
in the growth of the trade in the closing decades of the century has been
noted, there has been no consensus concerning its exact timing nor its
causes.
The purpose of this article is to contribute to redressing this gap in our
knowledge. It takes the following form. I start by summarizing the existing
literature and some contemporary views on the trade and then present data
on the following aspects of its development: the value of cotton imports
[here I shall be making use of data collected by John Fisher (1985, pp. 114,
116)], the weights imported and the state —unginned or ginned— in which
it was delivered, the relative importance of Barcelona and Cádiz as points
of import, the sources of the commodity in the empire, the shipping arran-
gements adopted for it, freight costs and selling price in Spain. In a con-
clusion, a short review of salient features in the trade’s development is pre-
sented.
It will not be possible to resolve all the issues which have been raised in
the historiography. Some —like the causes for the rise in the demand for
American cotton in Catalonia, the links between its availability and the
Catalan «take-off» in cotton or the developments in cotton growing in areas
of the Spanish empire— require articles in their own right. However it is
intended that the presentation of data on this range of issues will serve to
outline the main contours of the trade’s progress up to the hiatus occasio-
ned by the outbreak of war with Britain in 1797 and contribute thereby to
making the case for the success of the trade as an important event in itself
—a sign of significant market development and economic potential within
the Hispanic world— as well as representing an evident contribution to the
Catalan precocity in cotton.
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2. HISTORIOGRAPHY
The literature relating to the trade in American cotton has related prin-
cipally to the following areas: the success of the Maltese in holding onto
their early domination of the Barcelona cotton market (a barrier to the early
development of the American trade, it is believed), the initial difficulties
experienced in achieving the ginning of cotton and the barrier which this
represented to growth in the trade, problems encountered in shipping the
cotton (added to by the difficulty just mentioned), the relative failure of
Royal Trading Companies (those of Caracas and Barcelona) in promoting
cotton plantations in the Caribbean in the 1760s and 1770s, the appropria-
teness of the colonial reforms to stimulating the trade and the timing, and
causes, of the trade’s expansion in the period after the American war.
The preference for Maltese yarn has been accounted for in terms of its
price and the generous credit conditions on which it was supplied. So
favourable were these, it is argued, that sporadic attempts made by
Catalan calico-printers to spin American cotton should be interpreted as
purely «conjunctural» gestures, intended either to check Malta’s abuse of
its monopoly position or as quid pro quos —signals of an interest in pro-
moting the use of the imperial product— for the fiscal concessions gran-
ted by the crown on the import of the Maltese yarn. The interpretation was
first formulated by Ramon Grau and Pilar López (1974, pp. 25, 32): «el
pacte amb els comerciants maltesos importadors del cotó filat de Llevant»,
they claimed, «no solament ha resolt el problema [of cotton supply], sinó
que ha representat ... la posibilitat d’expandir-se minimitzant les inver-
sions ... Per aquesta raó, la gran majoria dels fabricants barcelonins con-
siderarà fins al finals de segle l’empresa de filar cotó a Catalunya com a
contrària als propis interessos» and they accounted for the establishment
of the Royal Barcelona Spinning Company in 1772 —the best known of the
initiatives to spin with American cotton (Thomson, 1992, pp. 239-44)— as,
«una iniciativa de gran volada contemplada des de l’exterior peró ... con-
cebuda pels fabricants barcelonins com a empresa rüinosa ... posada en
marxa únicament per tal de garantir al rei una quota mínima de consum
del cotó americà i aconseguir d’aquesta manera la suspensió de les noves
càrregues sobre el cotó maltès». The judgements have found general
acceptance, Alejandro Sánchez (1989, pp. 76-81), for example, describing
the Royal Spinning Company as «una empresa limitada, muy gravosa y
poco rentable».
The erratic demand for raw cotton occasioned by the calico-printers’
initiatives during the early years of growth in their industry was responded
to principally from Vera Cruz. The problem with this source of supply was
the difficulty in attaining the cleaning of the cotton at source and resultant
difficulties in its shipping. The issue is noted by Carlos Martínez Shaw
(1972, p. 266): «El algodón en rama debía ser despepitado in situ», he wri-
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tes, «pues de cada arroba catalana de 26 libras, solamente 10 resultaban
aprovechables para el hilado después de esta operación, siendo por tanto
inútil y gravoso el transporte a España». Its gravity is shown by the records
of cotton importing undertaken by the calico-printer Bernardo Gloria, who
pioneered cotton spinning in Catalonia during the 1750s. Of 76 tercios of
cotton imported on his behalf into Cádiz between 1751 and 1756, only 4
were delivered «sin pepita» having been cleaned «a mano». A ginning
machine dispatched to Vera Cruz, it was noted, had not yet been put into
service 4. The root cause of the difficulty is revealed by details of the cotton
supplying arrangements within the cotton industry of New Spain. Vera
Cruz, with Oaxaca, were the main cotton suppliers for the Puebla-centred
industry. The port was thus an appropriate place for the Catalan purchases
of cotton but the form in which the cotton was offered reflected the struc-
tures of the Mexican trade. Cotton cleaning was not carried out on the coas-
tal plain but in the mountainous interior, in and around Puebla, where the
density of population caused labour costs to be lower and the milder cli-
mate made working conditions bearable 5. Catalan exporters’ attempts to
have cotton ginned in situ were repeatedly frustrated in the face of these cir-
cumstances.
An emphasis on the problem of shipping the cotton is to be found regu-
larly in early documentation on the trade. The third epigraph to the article
reflected a generally held belief that it was shipping difficulties which were
holding the trade back and that, were adequate supplies ensured by admi-
nistrative measures, its use would soon spread in the peninsula. Such views
continued to be subscribed to until the very eve of the trade’s take-off: «El
estado actual de la navegación, la diversidad y abundancia de frutos que
presenta la América a quien trafica en ella», it was claimed by a spokesman
of Barcelona’s Chamber of Commerce in March 1783, «no... permitan espe-
rar que en los primeros años de paz pueda destinarse suficiente buque a tan
gran transporte, mayormente tratándose de un genero cuio flete no es sus-
ceptible de economía... imposibilitándole su mucho volumen y poco peso de
estar destinado al lastre» 6.
During the 1760s, with the foundation of the Royal Barcelona Trading
Company in 1755 and the diversification of the Basque Caracas company
into promoting cotton plantations, expectations for the development of the
trade shifted from the Vera Cruz area to the Caribbean, The so-called
«Comercio libre de Barlovento», of 16 October 1765, opening the islands of
the Caribbean to direct trade with nine peninsular ports, represented a fur-
ther stimulus to the switch. The new spirit is shown by a marked rise in
Catalan shipping ventures to the Caribbean with an annual average of at
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least 18-20 sailings for the period 1766-73, some 2/3 of which were free tra-
ding vessels 7. However, only minor returns in cotton were generated by
these, other tropical products, such as sugar, providing far better commer-
cial prospects 8.
On the other hand, the commercial companies mentioned had greater
resources than private traders for promoting new commodities such as cot-
ton and their royal charters had been granted in the expectation of their
playing a «developmental» role in the region. A fiscal incentive had also
been ceded in the form of customs exemptions on the import of cotton and
other tropical commodities into Spain. Successes were achieved. The
Barcelona Company imported almost 6,000 lbs of cotton in the course of
1764, supplying the requirements of the calico-printer Joan Canaleta who
was re-introducing cotton spinning at this point 9. The Caracas Company
also supplied cotton: over 20,000 lbs between 1767 and 1770 10 and had
developed a link with Canaleta, agreeing to purchase all the calicoes which
he manufactured with American cotton 11. Canaleta’s lead was followed by
other printers in the late 1760s. A virtuous circle appeared to be in process
of creation. The Barcelona and Caracas companies collaborated in 1768 in
delivering ginning equipment to the province of Caracas and the island of
Cumaná to facilitate the cleaning of cotton 12. Overall results, however, were
paltry. Over thirty years of trading, the Barcelona Company (1756-1785)
only imported 64,000 lbs of cotton, a mere 0.33 per cent of the value of its
total trade. Its priorities, overwhelmingly, were towards cacao, accounting
for 59.8 per cent of the value of its imports. Nor had much progress been
made with ginning, only 576 arrobas of cotton, 20 per cent of the total,
being definitely dispatched ginned 13. Efforts to promote the new trade had
been made during the 1760s but they had not been sustained. The Caracas
Company’s record was similar. Its 1760s cotton exports to Spain were the
highest in its history and at that stage it collaborated in the establishing of
cotton plantations in Venezuela, securing technical assistance from a
French planter from Martinique. This level of exports, however, was not
sustained and the plantations established were small scale, planters limi-
ting them to a few hundred plants directed at supplying their household
needs for cotton 14.
The apparent inability of either of these two companies, or private tra-
ders, to supply Barcelona’s cotton requirements provoked the drawing up of
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a report by the city’s Junta de Comercio in 1771 and extensive correspon-
dence between this body, the Junta General de Comercio, the governor of
Cumanà and the directors of the Barcelona Spinning Company between
1774 and 1775. The exchanges reveal the difficulties perceived as preventing
the successful launching of the trade. Principal blame was attributed to the
cost of the Caribbean product, higher at source than that of Levant raw cot-
ton sold in Barcelona. Uncompetitiveness was accounted for by the cotton
supplied being wild, rather than cultivated, and consequently costly to
gather and deficient in quality. The link between lack of ginning resources
and high freightage costs was again emphasized. «La base fundamental» for
remedying the situation, it was agreed, lay in the establishment of planta-
tions. The Governor of Cumanà’s response to a series of queries directed to
him was to confirm both the suitability of his island for «haciendas de algo-
dón» and the quality of the range of cottons which was being cultivated on
them, but to point out that that progress in the trade «consistirá en tener
suficiente provisión de Negros para la seguridad de trabajadores». From
Barcelona came the suggestion that cotton planters be provided with «algún
caudal» to buy slaves to remedy this deficiency 15.
Josep-Maria Delgado (1990, pp. 161-79) criticizes the appropriateness
of the colonial reforms adopted for the promotion of the trade. «El comer-
cio libre de Barlavento», he claims, provided only limited geographical
scope for provisioning in cotton, a particular handicap being its exclusion
of Venezuela which remained within the monopoly of the Caracas company.
With respect to the areas of the Caribbean to which Catalans did gain entry,
their poverty, he argues, and the low demand within them for Spanish pro-
ducts, meant that profits could only be attained on the return cargoes, lea-
ding to the prioritization of the export of luxury commodities over cotton.
These circumstances lead him to confirm the contemporary verdict that
cotton plantations were the only solution but he notes that the initiatives
taken here by Catalans in Cumaná were not persisted with as the island was
ceded to the Caracas Company in 1776. Nor were circumstances much
improved, he argues, by the various amplifications in the free trading area.
He judges the permission granted in 1776 and 1777 to admit the New
Granada ports of Cartagena and La Hacha, and the Regulation of Free
Trade of 1778, which extended the zone to include Chile, Peru, Rio de la
Plata and all New Granada, to have been of little service in view of the com-
mercial prospects in New Granada being insufficiently favourable to attract
direct Catalan voyages there and the fact that the 1778 measure left the
Venezuelan monopoly intact. He concedes that there was some response
during the 1780s to the curtailment of Cumaná supplies, New Granada cot-
ton taking its place, but claims that «l’arribada regular del cotó» was dela-
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yed until «l`autorització del comerç lliure amb Veneçuela [1789], oferint un
producte de superior qualitat».
Turning to this last question of the causes and timing of the final, suc-
cessful launching of the trade, Grau’s and López’s (1974, pp. 33-4) interpre-
tation had been different from that of Delgado. From 1775, they had clai-
med, the supply situation for cotton in America had improved on account
of the diffusion of cotton ginning equipment and the Regulation of Free
Trade of 1778 which facilitated trading in the commodity. They also attri-
buted importance to the level of demand for the commodity within
Catalonia. From 1779, they noted, private spinning with Levantine raw cot-
ton had been progressing (war interfering with provisioning from America)
and this trend, they argued, was accentuated by the victory in the American
war which «obre una conjunctura...favorable per la indústria i el comerç
Catalans» and incipient awareness of «els efectes multiplicadors de la nova
maquinària anglesa». Between them, they maintained, the influences trans-
formed calico printers’ attitudes towards spinning: «La filatura en si matei-
xa comença, amb la gran expansion de les activates, a presentar-se com a
empresa atractiva a nivell de cada empresari».
Estimates of Barcelona’s cotton imports for the 1780s produced by Joan
Carles Maixé Altés (1988, pp. 365-84) are consistent with such an interpre-
tation. They show over 400,000 lbs of raw cotton being imported in 1784, of
which 36 per cent came from America and the rest from the Levant and that
American imports on their own were approaching a million lbs by 1789 and
had franchised this frontier by 1790. He cites a customs official’s note on
this trend:
«Desde el ... año de 1785», the note reads, «se han aumentado algu-
nas Fábricas de Indianas y Pintados en varios Pueblos de esta
Provincia como son Olot, Vique, Manresa, Villanueva y Mataró y ...
prosperan como igualmente otras Fábricas de menor entidad situa-
das en Lugares pequeños que son muy útiles porque en ellas regular-
mente se hilan y texen los algodones de América, con poca o ninguna
mescla de los de Malta, o Levante».
However, although his figures and the comment suggest a «take-off» in
the trade, Maixé Altés is reticent about judging the developments as amoun-
ting to a «success» in view of a continued competitiveness shown by the
Maltese product and the fact that much of the cotton still arrived unginned.
The favourable trends show «el débil enraizamiento del sector algodonero
catalán en el mercado américano», he writes, but were «aun muy lejos de
responder a la integración entre industria metropolitana y mercado colo-
nial ... de la economía catalana ya entrado el siglo XIX».
The most recent tendency in the literature has been to attribute the
catalytic role in the trade’s development to an expansion in the export of
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printed linens to America. It is reflected in publications by Alejandro
Sánchez (1996, pp. 158-9) and Francesc Valls (2003, pp. 372-4) which argue
that the export of printed linens to America acted as the trigger for the
growth in American cotton imports. Sánchez was the first to suggest the
connection, claiming that «La exportación de lienzos a las colonias poten-
ció, como contrapartida, la llegada a la metrópoli, en mayores cantidades y
en mejores condiciones de calidad y precio, del algodón en rama america-
no». Francesc Valls, who in his thesis, had documented the trading rela-
tionship between Catalan producers of aguardiente and linen manufactu-
rers and traders in northern France which had facilitated the import of the
linens in question, developed the theory further. The aguardiente exporters
from south-east Catalonia who exchanged their product for northern linens,
he shows, diversified in the course of the 1780s into calico and linen prin-
ting in order to develop a stake in the booming export trades with America.
As a consequence of this involvement «es degueren adonar que important
cotó en floca com a retorn de les exportacions de pintats que feien cap a les
colònies podien tancar el cercle: seria la manera de trencar la dependència
tradicional que l’activitat estrictament cotonera de les seves fàbriques tenia
de la importació de cotó filat maltès».
2. QUANTITIES
General studies on Spain’s 18th century commercial links with America
provide only limited information on raw cotton imports. In table I below
details included in Antonio Garcia Baquero’s Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717-
1778) (1976, I, pp. 340-1) are reproduced which serve at least to give an idea
of the broad contours of the trade’s growth.
TABLE 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL AMERICAN COTTON IMPORTS (1746-96) *
(In lbs)
1746-65 14245
1766-78 190785
1779-96 767209
Note: * García Baquero gives the values of the imports.These were fixed at constant ratio of 3.2
pesos the arroba permitting a conversion to weights.
The granting of customs exemptions to all users of American cotton in
1766 gave rise, for some years, to more detailed records. Administering this
concession generated two types of document: «obligaciones», entered into
by the generally Cádiz merchants responsible for importing the cotton, by
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which a commitment was made to commercialize the customs-exempted
cotton within a year, and «tornaguias», drawn up at the point of sale, cer-
tifying the fulfilment of the earlier contracts. The source is far from com-
plete but provides some idea of the fluctuations in cotton flows until the
administration of the Regulation of Free Trade of 1778 gave rise to more
regular documentation. In extracting information from the source, I shall
be making use of the study on it undertaken by Antonio Miguel Bernal
(1986, pp 207-15).
The quantities of cotton imported recorded in these two types of docu-
ment are detailed in table 2 (Cádiz «obligaciones»: columns 1-3; Barcelona
«tornaguias»: columns 4-6). I have also included in the table the cotton
imports for a slightly longer time span of the Barcelona and Caracas
Companies (columns 7 & 8). The imports of the former were already cus-
toms exempt and thus would not have found their way into the other docu-
mentation 16. Finally, on the right of the table (column 9), are listed, for com-
TABLE 2
COTTON EXPORTS TO CÁDIZ/ BARCELONA
(In lbs)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
IMPORTS TO CÁDIZ TRANSFERS TO BARCA* CARACAS BARCA NIFO**
cia cia
Ginned Unginned Unspecified Ginned Unginned Unspec. Unspec. Unspec. Unspec.
1760 18000
1761 312
1764 5915
1765 21750
1767 0 0 25365 0 0 4732 5477 33250
1768 0 52250 1092 2525 468 8250 9349 249925
1769 57300 0 0 5285 1700 24692 3383
1770 1338 0 350 600 0 0 2363 16370 54000
1771 0 0 0 36825 0 0 26700 9590
1772 0 0 0 325 0 0 92 775
1773 0 0 0 69400 0 7837
1774 15864 0 0 15100 0 0 176000
1775 0 0 0 16800 0 0 7225
1776 0 0 0 0 0
1777 0 0 0 48400 0 6250 98875
1778 86175
1779 4351 187100
Totals 74502 52250 26807 145860 50568 45511 25015 63547 934665
Source: Bernal (1986, pp. 212-14).
Notes: * Barcelona. ** Nifo (1788).
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parative purposes, cotton shipments included in the only, detailed, publis-
hed record of colonial deliveries for these years, that of Deogracias Nifo
(1788) which was based on information drawn from gazettes and other
such publications.
Figures generated by the «obligaciones» (imports into Cádiz) and «tor-
naguias» (transfers to Barcelona) do not match, as can be seen. This was to
have been expected as the drawing up of the «tornaguias» took place some
time after that of the «obligaciones». There are other reasons for discrepan-
cies: not all the imported cotton was destined for Catalonia and Cádiz mer-
chants maintained stocks of cotton which might have been run down over
years. Apart from this, it is clear that fewer of the «obligaciones» than the
«tornaguias» have survived, making the latter the better source. What do they
show? Four peaks in imports, 1767-9, 1771, 1773 and 1777, are revealed.
Regarding the first of these, it is helpful to refer to the Cádiz imports (obli-
gaciones): far more cotton was being imported there at this stage than was
being dispatched to Barcelona, including large amounts of unginned cotton.
The Barcelona Company was making no contribution at this stage however
the table shows that the Caracas Company was importing regularly. The
situation regarding the second peak is different. As can be seen, it is at this
point that the Barcelona Trading Company’s cotton imports attained their
highest levels, providing the bulk of the cotton reaching Barcelona between
1770-1. The contribution reflects that period of exceptional collaboration of
the Company, in conjunction with the Compañia Guipuzcoana, in supplying
Catalan cotton needs which was referred to in the previous section. The
Barcelona Company’s imports, Oliva Melgar shows, were being drawn from
Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. The islands formed a part of the territorial
zone within which trading rights had been attributed to it 17. Cotton dispat-
ched directly to Bilbao, as the Caracas Company´s privilege allowed, was
unlikely, of course, to be re-exported to Barcelona, though a small consign-
ment of 350 lbs was dispatched to Barcelona via Cádiz in 1770 18. The 1773
peak in the figures (tornaguias) corresponds to the expansion period in the
Barcelona’s Royal Spinning Company’s actitivities. Nifo’s figures are re-assu-
ring regarding the representativeness of Bernal’s data. As can be seen they
show nearly identical peaks —1768, 1771, 1774 and 1777-1779— and their
greater chronological spread reveals the last peak stretching to the outbreak
of the American war, consistent with the claims of Grau and Lopez for grea-
ter elasticity in the supply of cotton from the mid 1770s.
To provide a first impression of the quantities of cotton imported follo-
wing the Regulation of Free Trade, I shall make use of the data included in
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John Fisher’s broad survey of Spain’s American trade for these years refe-
rred to in my introduction. Fisher records the value of cotton imports into
Cádiz and Barcelona between 1782 and 1796. As the bulk of cotton impor-
ting was into these two ports —only Malaga, apart from them, receiving sig-
nificant quantities— his results represent a useful starting point.
A preliminary remark has to be made about the values on which Fisher’s
figures are based. While official values were generally used in the records,
registers for Cádiz from 1786-1789 recorded both official and current values
and, from 1790, were restricted to the latter. Fisher responded to this situa-
tion by using official values for Cádiz imports up to 1789, to ensure their
consistency with the basis of valuation for other ports, however, he used
current values for Cádiz imports from 1790 as these, averaged over the
whole range of imported commodities with which he was concerned, were
only slightly higher than official ones. However, current prices for cotton
were significantly higher than official ones —482 against 256 reales per
quintal for ginned and 152 against 51 for unginned— and thus his use of
them in this case distorts his results from 1790, exaggerating the size of
imports to Cádiz and distorting the record for the total growth of the trade.
This problem will need to be borne in mind. Note should also be taken that
Fisher’s figures do not distinguish ginned from unginned cotton. He pre-
sents conglomerate figures which group the imports of cotton in its two sta-
tes. Fisher’s results are summarized in table 3 below. They require one fur-
TABLE 3
FISHER’S FIGURES FOR THE VALUE OF COTTON IMPORT
(GINNED + UNGINNED) FROM AMERICA
(In reales)
CÁDIZ BARCA TOTALS
1782 470090 169472 639562
1783 406543 406543
1784 625124 234221 859345
1785 669650 785443 1455093
1786 795296 1339742 2135038
1787 267821 162716 430537
1788 1100214 508738 1608952
1789 1236784 677761 1914545
1790 2073248 1949264 4022512
1791 3148246 3458109 6606355
1792 1115636 1261271 2376907
1793 1849879 2557006 4406885
1794 5854808 1263612 7118420
1795 2228888 561008 2789896
1796 9142489 9142489
Source: Fisher (1985, pp. 114-16).
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19 Fisher (1985, pp. 28-32).
20 The sources of the registers used are as follows: Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Sección
Indiferente General (Indif), 2180 (1785-7), 2183 (1787-8), 2209A (1784), 2209B (1781-2, 1784),
2210 (1784-5), 2211 (1784-5), 2212 (1785-6), 2443 (1787-8), 2444 (1788), 2445 (1784, 1788), 2447
(1789-90), 2448 (1790), 2449 (1790-1, 1796), 2450 (1791), 2451 (1791-2), 2453-4 (1793), 2455
(1793-4), 2459 (1795-6), 2460 (1796).
21 Matilla Tascón (1965, pp. 209-10).
ther clarification. The lack of imports recorded for Barcelona for 1796
reflect Fisher’s failure to locate import registers for this port for that year 19.
As can be seen, Fisher’s calculations show four short cycles in the tra-
de’s progression. The first, a post American war one, peaks in 1786. A
second follows a sharp decline in imports in 1787 and peaks in 1791. There
are then two short cycles: 1792-4, which sees a yet higher peak in imports
being attained, and 1795-6 which witnesses a last, brilliant year for the
trade experienced just before the outbreak of war with Britain in 1797
brought things to a standstill.
In view of the immensity of the source —Fisher’s study is based on the
analysis of over 4,000 cargo registers— and the limited time which I have had
at my disposal, my analysis of cotton imports is limited to a selection of key
years in the trade’s development: 1784, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1793 and 1796 20. To
the data collected for these years, I have added data for 1792 which was
published in the Balanza del Comercio for that year 21. The principal distinc-
tion between my figures and those of Fisher is that I have recorded weights
rather than the value of the cotton imported and the state —ginned or ungin-
ned— in which it was imported. There were some problems in attaining com-
plete data in terms of weight in so far that, for a minority of cases, this is not
registered, the quantities imported being recorded in terms of the containers
within which they were packed. These ranged from «pacas» (bales), «sacos»
(sacks), «fardos» (loads), «tercios» (mule loads) to «zurrones» or «serones»
(large baskets or paniers) but, on the other hand, were of relatively standar-
dized capacities and thus it is possible to attribute weights to the cotton
carried in them. My results therefore, summarized in table 4 below, represent
a reasonably accurate record of the weight of the cotton whose import is
recorded in the ships’ registers which I have been able to locate for my sam-
ple years. It should be noted, however, that I was unable to trace 18 registers
used by Fisher for calculating Barcelona’s 1786 imports and that my total for
this year is thus too low. On the other hand, I was able to locate the Barcelona
registers for 1796 and can provide an import total for this port for this year.
My conversion rates (to lbs) for the different packages, and the grounds for
my adopting them, are included in the note under the table.
Turning to what my table reveals, a preliminary is to explain the «other»
column. This consists of details which I have found of imports of cotton
into ports other than Cádiz and Barcelona for certain years. The majority of
these imports were into Malaga. At this point, to facilitate the comparison
J. K. J. THOMSON
290
of my figures with Fisher’s, I also present conglomerate (ginned and ungin-
ned) figures. The two sets of figures are expressed graphically in figure 1
which follows this paragraph. Identical results were not to have been expec-
TABLE 4
RAW COTTON IMPORTS TO SPAIN FOR SAMPLE IN THE 1780S
AND 1790S YEARS*
(Ginned and unginned in lbs)
Cádiz Barca Other Total
1784 418650 370699 102 789451
1786 735462 172275 200 907937
1788 1103057 357500 65608 1526165
1790 613470 931678 315082 1860230
1791 1759309 1990296 1150594 4900199
1792 2480050
1793 843305 2186650 3029955
1796 2924163 1092689 244801 4261653
Sources: AGI, Indiferente General, 2180, 2183, 2209A-B, 2210-12, 2443-5, 2447-51, 2453-5, 2459-60.
Notes: * The conversion rates for different containers which I have used are: «pacas» @ 278 lbs (cal-
culated on the basis of 12 purchases in this unit made by Barcelona’s Royal Spinning Company in 1784
and 1785 where weight is also recorded (BC, Fons Gonima-Janer, libro 1)); «sacos» and «fardos»: these
are less uniform, their weight in the same source varying from 30 to 150 lbs for the former and 80-156
lbs for the latter. I have used a conversion rate of 100 lbs for both. The contents of «tercios» also varied
between 140 and 180 lbs. I have adopted a conversion rate of 150 lbs for them. Weights for «serones» (bas-
kets) appear to have been constant at about 100 lbs. This is the weight which I have adopted. 
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ted. Weights are being compared with values. In addition the data differen-
ces for 1786 and 1796 previously noted and the issue of Fisher’s reliance on
current prices for Cádiz imports from 1790 have their effects. The impact of
some of these discrepancies is evident. There is no upturn in my 1786 figu-
res to compare with that recorded by Fisher and, as can be seen, from 1790,
with current values being used by Fisher for Cádiz, the gap between the two
sets of figures increases. But, despite these predictable differences, the tra-
jectory formed by my sample years is reassuringly similar to that which
Fisher’s figures record, with shared upturns in 1788, 1791 and 1793. There
is an inconsistency for 1792 with Fisher’s curve experiencing a far sharper
decline than mine but here, it will be recalled, we are using different sour-
ces. The upturns in 1796 are also common, however it is surprising that
Fisher’s, even though it is swollen by his use of current values, is so much
steeper than mine if it purely represents imports into Cádiz.
3. GINNED AND UNGINNED
Table 2 provides some information on the state, ginned or unginned, in
which the cotton was being imported. As can be seen, ginned cotton repre-
sented the majority, however the figures for «obligaciones» and «torna-
guias» show that quantities arriving unginned were still substantial —41
per cent in the case of the former source and 26 per cent in the case of the
latter—. If, as is likely, the majority of the cotton whose state is unspecified
in the documentation was unginned, then it is probable that about half of
the cotton reaching Barcelona was unginned. A later report by Barcelona’s
Junta de Comercio reveals that the arrival of such large quantities of ungin-
ned cotton in Barcelona caused considerable problems to the infant spin-
ning sector there. A recourse adopted in Cádiz to the excess of cotton in this
state was to re-export it. Bernal’s article records that 56,590 lbs of cotton
were reexported in 1768, 40,125 lbs of which were unginned and the rest of
unspecified quality (1986, pp. 211-12). However, the report reveals that the
Catalan response had been more proactive. Initially it had taken the form of
resorting to machinery to deseed the cotton, versions of ginning machines
being used in Malta and the Levant being imported and improved upon.
The machinery, however, was not found satisfactory as it tended to break
the cotton seeds, impregnating the cotton with them and also leaving a resi-
due of black skin «lo que hacía un mal tercio al Algodon despepitado».
Because of this, a switch had been made to a system of «demote con las
manos» which, it is noted in the report, «fue facil conseguir ... por la mise-
ria de muchos mayormte en un Pahis donde la necesidad les obliga â vivir de
industria». This alternative strategy was so successful that «se logró en
breve tiempo el desmote de todas las partidas de Algodón que havia en esta,
y aun las que se hallaban en Cádiz detenidas y sin venta alguna detenidas
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22 BC, JC, leg 33, n.º 10, 3, letter of Sept. 12th 1774. My emphasis.
23 AHN, Hacienda, DO, 8026, 2322, 22nd Dec. 1769.
por este defecto» 22. Thus a solution was found for what had been conceived
as the major obstacle to establishing the trade. The pattern prevailing in
New Spain —the carrying out of the deseeding and cleaning of cotton at the
point of manufacture— had effectively been introduced into Spain. The suc-
cess was one of the grounds for the crown’s deciding to continue to back the
development of the Catalan industry. Miguel de Múzquiz, Secretary of
Finance, in a decree dated December 22nd 1769, extended prohibitions on
the import of «cotonadas, blabets y biones en blanco o en azul», at the same
time as winding down customs concessions for spun cotton import from the
Levant, «satisfecho el Rey», edict reads, «del que han dado las de Cataluña
al proyecto de despepitar, e hilar en aquel Principado el Algodon de nues-
tras Americas, de modo, que dentro de poco tiempo se espera, no necesitar
usar del de Levante» 23.
The division between ginned and unginned cotton imported for my
sample years not disclosed in the previous section is recorded in table 5.
There were some difficulties in making the distinction as the state in which
the cotton was imported was not always noted. This problem is generally
surmountable, however, as the figures recorded under the Regulation of
Free Trade generally include the value of the imports: the sum at which this
is set makes it possible to distinguish the ginned from the unginned as it
TABLE 5
GINNED AND UNGINNED COTTON IMPORTED, CONVERSION OF UNGINNED
TO GINNED* TO ATTAIN ALL GINNED TOTALS**
Cádiz Barca Other Totals % Total
Ginned Unginned G U G U G U U If all G
1784 136125 282525 127517 243182 102 263642 525801 63 438655
1786 536463 198999 172275 200 708738 199199 22 775137
1788 422004 681053 156775 200725 408 65200 579187 946978 62 894846
1790 498042 115428 549328 382350 258199 56883 1305569 554661 30 1490456
1791 1258753 500556 769882 1220414 257425 893169 2286060 2614139 53 3157440
1792 1684475 795575 32 1949666
1793 740605 102700 1173100 1013550 1913705 1116250 37 2285788
1796 2373338 550825 696059 396630 134588 110213 3203985 1057668 25 3556541
Sources: as table 4.
Notes: * By reduction of 2/3. ** Where the state in which the cotton (ginned or unginned) is neither
recorded, nor revealed by the valuations, I have attributed it as follows: La Guaira: that unspecified for
1784, 1792, 1796 as ginned, that unspecified for 1791 (when mixed batches were being supplied) as 2/3
ginned, 1/3 unginned; Cartagena: unspecified has beeen attributed as ginned throughout bar 1791 for
which the same 2/3 ginned, 1/3 unginned break down adopted as for La Guaira; Vera Cruz and Havana
100% unginned when state not specified; Lima: 1790 as unginned, 1796 as ginned.
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was calculated at a higher rate. In cases in which neither quality nor value
is detailed, I have attributed the cotton’s state on the basis of the predomi-
nant form in which the American port from which it proceeded was exporting
cotton at the time. This is a reasonably reliable basis for making the dis-
tinction as different ports, as we shall see, tended to specialize in exporting
their cotton in one form or the other. In the table’s right hand column I have
provided nominal totals for cotton imports had all cotton been ginned. This
is to provide net figures for the real quantities of clean cotton which the
combined ginned and unginned imports would have yielded. This was cal-
culated by reducing my unginned totals by 2/3 —the weight loss which they
would have experienced in ginning— and adding them to the ginned
imports.
Figure 2 relates these «all ginned» figures to my composite ones from
table 5. It shows that the calculations have had the predictable consequen-
ce of reducing the totals of «all ginned» with respect to the composite figu-
res in a ratio proportional to the percentage of cotton imported unginned in
any year (this ratio is detailed in the second column from the right of table
5). Such ratios were highest in 1788 and 1791 and their impact on the «gin-
ned only» import total causes the former year to lose its place as a peak in
the trade’s development within my data and the latter to lose its position as
the highest point of imports to 1796. The third column from the right with
the total, unginned imports is of interest. It shows that the Vera Cruz/Puebla
model for cotton supplying/cleaning was being followed on an enormous
1784
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24 BC, JC, Llibre 84, letter of 1 March 1769.
scale at this take-off stage in the American cotton trade with (already) in
1788 nearly a million lbs of unginned cotton being shipped across the
Atlantic for cleaning in Catalonia and more than 2? million lbs in 1791 —
probably the peak year for this particular trade— and over a million lbs still
in 1796.
4. CÁDIZ AND BARCELONA AS POINTS OF ENTRY, RE-EXPORT
Regarding the shipping of the cotton, the documentation concerning
the administration of the import duty concessions for cotton granted in
1766 shows that in the 1760s and early 1770s the transatlantic route was
being assured primarily by Cádiz merchants and shipping. None of the
importers listed in the documentation, nor the names of the ships being
made use of, is recognizably Catalan with the exception, in the case of the
former, of one Josep Padrés who had also served as Glòria’s agent in Vera
Cruz in the 1750s. On the other hand, the trade between Cádiz and
Barcelona is shown to be firmly in Catalan hands: «s’ha de destacar»,
Bernal (1986, pp. 208, 210) notes, «el control català del circuit [between
Cádiz and Barcelona], puix que els remitents de Cadis, així com els vaixells
i llurs patrons són majoritàriament, si no exclusivament, catalans». That the
dependent position of Catalan shipping at this stage was a disadvantage is
suggested by a request made by Josep Canaleta, heir of Joan Canaleta, to
the Secretary of Hacienda in April 1768 for permission to send one or two
ships «de porte de ocho, diez o doze mil quintales» (200 to 300 tons) to Vera
Cruz «para facilitar que vengan Algodones de America para el usso de las
fabricas del Reyno» 24.
Tables 3, 4 and 6 all contain data which contribute to charting a process
of emancipation from this dependency. Table 3 will only be used with res-
pect to Fisher’s pre-1790 results in view of the distortion which his use of
current values for Cádiz from that year has occasioned. For the prior period
his results are particularly useful as they are more complete than mine.
They show Cádiz’s imports leading the expansion in the trade which follo-
wed the American war, with Barcelona then becoming the more powerful
agency for the trade’s growth in 1785 and 1786. Regarding the second cycle
in the trade’s growth referred to earlier, this, too, it can be seen, is initiated
from Cádiz (higher import figures for 1788 and 1789), however from 1790
Barcelona takes the lead. Switching to table 6, which includes my results for
ginned and unginned imports to Barcelona and Cádiz, which have the vir-
tue over «all ginned» figures of showing the physical volume of imports and
revealing, thus, the shipping effort involved for them, this shows Barcelona
continuing to be dominant in 1791 and 1793 but losing its lead in 1796.
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Finally, table 6 below makes it possible to compare these ginned and ungin-
ned figures with «all-ginned». As can be seen, with cotton imports calcula-
ted in these terms, Barcelona loses its predominance over Cádiz for 1791
and has its leadership pruned for 1790 and 1793: it was importing far more
unginned cotton than Cádiz.
TABLE 6
«ALL GINNED» IMPORTS INTO CÁDIZ
AND BARCELONA (1784-1796)
(In lbs)
Cádiz Barca
1784 230300 208577
1786 602796 172275
1788 649021 223683
1790 536518 676778
1791 1425605 1176686
1793 774838 1510950
1796 2556946 2556946
The existence of a second set of import figures for Barcelona, drawn
largely from customs sources, makes it possible to amplify our data base
for Barcelona. It also serves as a check for the reliability of the Cádiz regis-
ters on which I am principally relying. The details are included in table 7.
TABLE 7
CUSTOMS FIGURES FOR IMPORTS OF COTTON TO BARCELONA (1a, b, c) 
AND SHIP REGISTER FIGURES FOR «ALL GINNED» FROM TABLE 5 (2), 1784-96
1 a 1 b 1 c If all 2 all
Unginned Ginned ginned ginned
1783 223900 223900
1784 33000 120000 131000 208577
1786 172275
1787 36950 41750 54066
1788 267650 137075 226291 223683
1789 813825 103225 374500
1790 501350 602375 769491 676778
1791 1176686
1792 644050 741887 956570
1793 758200 845700 1098433 1510950
1795 143662` 985475 1033362
1796 828269
Source: Maixé Altés (1991), p. 180. 
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25 Delgado Ribas (1982, pp. 99-119); Vilar (1962, vol. 3, p. 65).
26 BC, Fons Gonima Janer, libro 18, copiador de cartas, 17 June 1786.
27 Okuno (1999, pp. 47-66) and García Balaña (2004, pp. 57-146).
28 Maixé Altés (1991, p. 181).
The two sources, it should be noted, record slightly different cotton flows.
The import details for Barcelona in table 6 are for cotton imported directly
from America. The customs records for Barcelona, on the other hand,
would have captured both this cotton and also that being re-exported from
Cádiz and other ports. Despite this, with respect to the four years —1784,
1788, 1790 and 1793— recorded by both sources, the distinct sets of figu-
res for two of the years, 1788 and 1790, are very similar. Those resulting
from the Cádiz registers are considerably higher than the customs ones for
1784 and 1793 on the other hand, despite the fact that they do not include
re-exported cotton. This suggests that the Cádiz registers represent the bet-
ter source.
Taking the two sources together, we can elaborate slightly on our inter-
pretation of the trajectory of the cotton import trade into Barcelona. 1787,
not included in my sample, was a year of near total commercial and indus-
trial paralysis as Catalonia experienced its first, modern «business crisis» 25.
Its impact on cotton imports is shown. «The private spinners appear to be
withdrawing and the Company is almost alone at present in continuing this
industry» the directors of Barcelona’s Royal Spinning Company noted as
early as June 1786 26. By 1788 it was the Royal Company itself which had
abandoned its spinning efforts and, thus, private spinners returning to the
trade were responsible for the recovery of imports in this year. It is interes-
ting to note the coincidence of this with the boom in the import of ungin-
ned cotton. Theirs was a proto-industry of a simple, labour-intensive kind:
it was expanding into ginning as well as into carding and spinning 27. 1793
was Barcelona’s record year, with 27 ships importing American cotton: the
curtailment of Marseilles’ cotton deliveries with the French war had forced
more intensive use of American supplies 28. High import figures were then
sustained through to 1795, we see, despite navigational difficulties occasio-
ned by the conflict. By 1796, however, the international tensions —despite
the truce with France negotiated at Bâle in July 1795— were beginning to
have an impact on the Barcelona trade: this is suggested by the significant
decline in imports for 1796.
Returning to the Cádiz/Barcelona distinction, although this is clearly of
great significance with respect to the issue of direct participation of Catalan
shipping in the provision of American cotton, it can be less crucial with res-
pect to tracing the ultimate destination of imported cotton, for much of the
cotton delivered in Cádiz, and almost all of that delivered to Malaga, was for
re-export to Barcelona. Results of research by Joan Carles Maixé Altés on
the Customs Records of Barcelona capture some of this re-exporting and
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provide us with more information about the dynamics of the trade. They are
summarized in table 8. The year 1784 is a significant case. Table 3 showed
Barcelona and Cádiz’s cotton imports standing at similar levels during this
year. The evidence included here suggests that a significant proportion of
these Cádiz imports was being re-exported to Barcelona and that Catalan
imports were thus driving the trade at this stage too. The details for 1796
also repay reflection: for the opposite reasons. In this year there was no
growth in the re-export trade in cotton to Barcelona from other ports which
might have accounted for the weakening of Barcelona’s position as an
importing centre noted for this year. Something had clearly changed in the
trade. This will be investigated shortly.
The right hand column of the table records the number of Catalan ships
involved in importing American cotton. As can be seen, for the years in
which Maixé Altés has provided this information, Catalan shipping enjoyed
a near monopoly of the trade. Only from 1795 do we find a few mentions of
ships from other ports. The details thus provide an illustration of the degree
TABLE 8
SHIPS ENTERING BARCELONA CARRYING AMERICAN COTTON, 1781-1799
Direct from
Via Cadiz or America Ships
YEAR another Spanish (sometimes with TOTAL described as
port visit to other Catalan
Spanish port)
1781 1 2 3 3
1782 1 1 1
1783 4 2 6 6
1784 14 6 20 13
1785 6 8 14 13
1786 6 6 12 11
1787 7 6 13 13
1788 9 4 13 7
1789 8 9 17
1790 14 5 19
1791 6 16 22
1792 8 3 11
1793 11 16 27
1794 9 10 19 17
1795 2 11 13 10
1796 5 17 22 18
1797 5 1 6 1
1798 6 6 3
1799 2 2 0
Totals 123 123 246
Source: Maixé Altés (1991, pp. 198-217).
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to which Catalan shippers had established an autonomous stake in Spain’s
colonial trade with its American empire. A major change had taken place
since the 1760s and early 1770s. Clearly this was a critical component in the
supplying of the Catalan cotton market and the general expansion of the
trade.
What had changed by 1796 was the development in, or extension of,
international trading in Spain’s colonial cotton. The dimensions of this in
1792 and 1795 were captured in the Spanish balances of trade published for
these years. The details are included in table 9. As can be seen, most of the
cotton was going to Britain, but France too was taking a significant share
before the outbreak of the war with Spain in 1793 and Italy was a major
buyer in both years, especially 1796.
TABLE 9
RAW COTTON EXPORTS FROM SPAIN
(In lbs)
1792 1792 1795 1795
Destination unginned ginned unginned ginned
England 98300 847275* 32710 1000313
France 21400 287150 4192
Italy 128400 92300 2600
It: Tuscany 28600 2600
It: Genoa, Milan 3630 308359
Germany 9500 2477 206836
Hamburg 15825
Holland 20500 1200
United States 200 8250
Denmark 52
Total 268800 1237425 67417 1546427
Sources: Balanza del Comercio de España con las potencias extranjeras año de 1792, (Madrid, 1803),
section Q; Matilla Tascón (1995, pp. 35, 48, 52, 64, 76, 89, 151).
Notes: * including 70200 lbs imported from the Philippines.
5. ORIGINS
The sources of the cotton imported are recorded in all the «obligacio-
nes» signed between 1766 and 1777. The port of Cartagena handled an over-
whelming majority of the trade, supplying 70,826 lbs of the ginned, 52,250
lbs of the unginned and 28,702 lbs of the cotton of unspecified quality
against only 1,430 lbs proceeding from Vera Cruz and 350 lbs being sup-
plied by the Caracas company. Second in importance to Cartagena in suppl-
ying the Barcelona market during these years were the Caribbean islands.
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29 Carrera Pujal (1947, vol. 3, pp. 23-4).
30 Diaz-Trehuelo Spinola (1965, pp. 343-51), lists imports of Royal Philippine Company ships
for 1787-90.
It is Cartagena, however, and the kingdom which it served, New Granada,
which the data show to be the only part of the Spanish empire which was
in a position to supply large quantities of cotton at this stage. It was delive-
red in substantial consignments: 25,000 lbs were carried by the Frigate
Constanza in 1767, 52,250 lbs by the Nuevo Loreto in 1768 and 36,800 lbs
by the San Francisco de Asis in 1769. A vast delivery of 27,000 arrobas, or
675,000 lbs, from Cartagena is recorded by the Sociedad Economica de
Madrid for the mid 1770s. It is probable here that arrobas have been mis-
taken for lbs but even in terms of the smaller denomination this was a subs-
tantial cargo compared to those proceeding from Vera Cruz, Caracas or pro-
vided by the Barcelona Company 29. Anthony McFarlane (1993, p. 142, n.
51), in his study on Colombia before Independence, comments on the «very
small» quantities of cotton exported thence to Spain during the 1770s,
however the figures on which he bases this conclusion —deliveries of
64,325 lbs in 1770 and 45,025 lbs in 1775— appear to represent the maxi-
mum which the empire was capable of supplying at this stage.
In table 10 the details of the ports of origin of the cotton delivered after
the passing of the Regulation of Free Trade are listed. The near global range
of the areas supplying cotton shown by the table is striking. The extent of
the Spanish empire provided scope for drawing on the resources of two dif-
ferent civilizations in which cotton was the dominant fibre. Recourse to the
raw cotton of the east, on the other hand, it can be seen, was very limited
and far less extensive than contemporary importing of muslins and other
cotton cloths, by the Royal Philippines Company 30. Within the American
supplying zone there were some variations over time in the importance of
suppliers. Havana enjoyed a brief hegemony through to the mid 1780s. It
should be noted, however, that Havana rather than exporting Cuban cotton
(little evidence exists of cotton growing on the island) was serving mainly as
an entrepôt for the trade, a rôle which was strengthened in view of the con-
voy systems resorted to at the time of the American war. At this early stage
some cotton was also imported from the Viceroyalty of la Plata —recently
admitted to the free trading zone—. This area, however, was never to beco-
me an important supplier. In contrast, Vera Cruz and Cartagena were
important suppliers throughout and, from 1790, the ports of Callao and
Guayaquil in the Viceroyalty of Peru became regular providers. The 1796
evidence shows an eastward shift in the provisioning area with substantial
new points of supply emerging —Maracaibo, Cumaná, New Guiana and
Trinidad—.
On the other hand, if the quantities shipped from different ports are
counted, it is concentration, rather than dispersion, which appears as the
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31 At least, as I am not including in this figure cotton recorded as proceeding from Cartagena via
Havana which was most probably grown in New Granada nor the significant quantities of ginned cot-
ton proceeding directly from Havana between 1781 and 1784 which also, probably, had this source.
32 Izard (1972, pp. 81-145).
salient characteristic of the trade. Cartagena and Santa Marta were by far
the most regular suppliers, responsible between them for at least 65 per
cent of the ginned cotton supplied for our sample years 31. There is no year
in the table in which large supplies of cotton were not dispatched from
Cartagena de Indias to Spain: exports from this port stood at over 1/2
million lbs a year by 1786, reached a level of over a million lbs in 1790 and
stood at nearly 2 million lbs by 1796. Vera Cruz was the principal supplier
of unginned cotton, providing 69 per cent of the total delivered in this form.
It dispatched over 1/2 million lbs in 1788, over 2 million in 1791, but from
then its exports declined: around 1 million lbs in 1791, 1/2 million in 1796.
There is continuity, thus, respecting the trade’s initial suppliers: New
Granada, as during the 1760s, was by far the principal source for ginned
cotton, Vera Cruz, as in the very first years of the trade, was the main sour-
ce for unginned. It should be emphasized, on the other hand, that the
unginned trade of which Vera Cruz provided such an important percentile
share, was a far smaller trade than that in ginned. And further, as we have
seen, its size is reduced yet further in the conversion to «all ginned» figures.
If we calculate Vera Cruz’s share of the «all ginned» trade it is reduced to 12
per cent. In Cartagena’s case, however, if a similar calculation is made with
respect to its smaller share of the unginned trade to produce «all ginned»
figures, its share of the total trade in «all ginned» remains clearly dominant:
56 per cent of the total. It is followed by that of La Guiara and other ports
to the east of Maracaibo which supplied 17.5 per cent of the overall total
trade over these years.
On the other hand, the eastward shift in the trade had become marked
by 1796. It was a significant development, related to an extraordinary
expansion of the Venezuelan economy during these years, one contributed
to by the liberalizing reforms which facilitated far intenser interaction with
neighbouring French, British and Dutch colonies. The plantation system
was now coming of age. The revolt of Toussaint in Haiti in 1791 was a fur-
ther catalyst, disrupting French supplies of cotton and disseminating
French capital, enterprise and technology to Spanish colonies 32. The expan-
sion was at the expense of some second ranking cotton suppliers, such as
Vera Cruz and Havana: specialization in commodity production was deve-
loping. Cartagena, however, was holding its own: it provided 54 per cent of
the cotton supplied to Spain in 1796 against 42 per cent provided by this
bloque of eastern suppliers. La Guiara was the leading exporter among
them. It had graduated to the position of second, Hispanic «mass» cotton
producer.
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33 33 ships from a sample of 76 entering Cádiz with cotton on board between 1784 and 1791.
34 56 of a sample of 73 against 9 frigates between 1784 and 1791.
35 20 polacras returned from America to Barcelona against just 7 bergantins, 1 saetia, 1 paque-
bot and 5 frigates.
36 This would mean a maximum of 6 ships with cotton cargoes but it is more likely that there
were 3.
37 Pecking-order of Spanish American commodities from García Baquero (1993, pp. 91, 93).
6. SHIPPING
The frigate, the largest ship, bar the occasional «navío», used in the
Spanish Atlantic trade, averaging some 320 tons, was the principal vessel in
which cotton was imported into Cádiz 33. In Barcelona’s case it was prima-
rily the saetia (av. 155 tons), along with the polacra (av. 170 tons) and the
bergantin (av. 125 tons) which were used between 1784 and 1791 34,
although in 1796 it was the slightly larger polacra which became the most
frequently used vessel 35. The tense political circumstances prevailing were
probably leading to a concentration of cargoes in fewer, larger vessels.
For the period up to the approval of the Regulation of Free Trade, such
ships very rarely carried cotton. Deogracias Nifo’s data serve too to demons-
trate the marginality of the commodity in trading activities at this stage.
There were several years with no deliveries at all recorded (for example a
sole delivery between 1772 and 1776) and for the years in which deliveries
were recorded, only a small minority of returning vessels carried cotton. For
example Nifo records the arrival of 30 vessels in 1765 and probably just one
of the eleven of these which reached Cádiz in July was responsible for the
delivery in that month of a relatively small cargo of 21,750 lbs of cotton. For
1778, he records 33 arrivals of vessels of which only six took place in the
months for which cotton deliveries were recorded 36.
Even after the end of the American war, with a growing trade, cotton
was far from a universal cargo. Shipping practices varied between the ports
of origin in accordance with the range of commodities requiring transport,
the pecking order in the values of these, the destination in Spain of the ves-
sel (it was a disadvantage, evidently, taking cotton to a port from which it
was going to have to be reshipped), the demands of the partners involved in
financing of the voyage, the market situation in Spain for cotton and tech-
nical considerations relating to the achievement of a balance in cargoes bet-
ween light, bulky products such as cotton and heavy items serving as
ballast. An understanding of such criteria assists in clarifying the range of
determinants on the cargo space offered for cotton.
In most cases the carriage of cotton was not the principal function of
voyages. Although the fibre was a relatively valuable commodity, its export,
even with the trade expanding, still only accounted for just 1 per cent of the
total value of commodity exports —less than the value of cacao, cochineal,
sugar, indigo, hides, tobacco, cascarilla (a herbal bark), dyewood, and only
ahead of wool 37—. The usual situation was thus for cotton to occupy a
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38 Fisher (1985, pp. 121-2). In 1793, the year of maximal sailings from Vera Cruz, 29 of 50 ves-
sels carried cotton.
39 The registers for these ships are held in AGI, Indif, 2451.
minority place within ships’ cargoes. On the other hand, there were varia-
tions in the priority given to cotton in different ports. Some of these can be
observed from comparing the cotton shipping record of the three principal
points of export, Vera Cruz, La Guiara and Cartagena.
Vera Cruz was the busiest Spanish American port, serving the vast mar-
ket and production area of New Spain. Cotton, in its case, was a regular, but
minor export involving, even in the years of maximal exports, not much
more than 1/2 the vessels sailing to Spain 38. The average quantities of cot-
ton included in the cargoes of such ships sailing to Cádiz and Barcelona in
the years 1788, 1790, 1791, 1793 and 1796 are detailed in table 11. As can
be seen, there is a sharp contrast in the average size of the cotton cargoes
destined for the two ports. Loading of ships did not depend purely on an
impersonal process of maximizing freight revenue but was rather determi-
ned principally by the joint participators in the shipping venture on whose
behalf the captain or master made purchases for the return voyage.
Participators in many of the voyages from Barcelona to Vera Cruz were the
very cotton manufacturers who would make use of the cotton. For ship-
ments there, consequently, cotton was not purely a «top-up» commodity. On
the other hand, the small size of the average loads of cotton loaded for
Cádiz in most years suggests that they were purely being carried as top-up
items. Their value represented a tiny percentage of that of total cargoes.
Even in the case of the largest cargoes of cotton being carried to Barcelona
in the course of 1791, cotton’s value represented a small percentage of the
total. Those on the ships Jesus Nazareño and Nuestra Señora de la
Concepción (134,100 lbs and 109,000 lbs respectively) represented 3 and 2
per cent of the total value of the cargoes being carried 39. Cochineal was the
most valuable product being exported from Vera Cruz followed by sugar,
tobacco, tabasco, pepper and hides. The sort of ratio which existed betwe-
TABLE 11
COTTON SHIPMENTS FROM VERA CRUZ TO CÁDIZ AND BARCELONA
(In lbs)
To CÁDIZ To BARCELONA
YEAR
ships av. cargo ships av. cargo
1788 12 28000 2 89000
1790 3 2000 6 43000
1791 9 36000 11 110000
1793 10 16670 19 54000
1796 12 24000 12 35000
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40 AGI, Indif, 2459.
41 Fisher (1985, p. 141), records 37 ships sailing from La Guiara in 1793 and 40 in 1796.
42 AGI, Indif., 2459, 2460.
en the value of such products and that of the cotton being carried is illus-
trated by the cargo of the ship La Diligencia which carried the largest cot-
ton consignment from Vera Cruz to Cádiz in the course of 1796. The value
of this cotton, 183,562 reales, was less than 10 per cent of the sugar alone
which, among other additional commodities, was being carried 40. The flou-
rishing state of trade beween Vera Cruz and Cádiz and Barcelona meant
that cargo space for cotton was frequently available, but cotton’s inferiority
in value to the other commodities being exported made it impossible for the
city to become a «staple» port for the commodity.
Shipping arrangements for cotton from La Guiara, summarized in table
12, bore some similarities to those from Vera Cruz. Frequent, but even sma-
ller, cargoes of cotton were carried on a large numbers of ships —around
2/3 of the sailings in 1793 and 1796 41— whose arrival, the registers show,
were spaced regularly through the year. In La Guiara’s case, however, it was
primarily ginned cotton which was being exported. The port was unusual in
terms of the suppliers of ginned cotton in dispatching its product in such
small batches, the introduction of ginning generally being combined with
specialization in, and mass production of, the commodity. In 1796, howe-
ver, it can be seen that this situation was altering with the dispatch of con-
siderably larger batches of cotton. La Guiara was distinct too insofar that
nearly all its cotton was sent to Cádiz. The detailing of items other than cot-
ton included in La Guiara cargoes illuminates the grounds for this prefe-
rence. In 1796 two vessels named Nuestra Señora de la Carmen carried bat-
ches of cotton to Cádiz valued at 37,440 reales in one case and 285,600 in
the other. The first vessel was also carrying a cargo of cacao valued at
2,131,600 reales and in the second an even more valuable load of cacao was
being carried as well as indigo worth 2,287,476 reales 42. The primacy of a
range of far more valuable commodities than cotton among Venezuelan
exports enforced a focus of its shipping on Cádiz, Spain’s principal whole-
TABLE 12
COTTON SHIPMENTS FROM LA GUIARA, 1790S
(In lbs)
CÁDIZ BARCELONA
YEAR
ships av. cargo ships av. cargo
1790 8 11000 1 11300
1791 19 16000 1 950
1793 23 5500 4 6000
1796 29 29000 3 26000
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43 On Cádiz’s continued dominance in this sphere after 1778 see Fisher (1985, pp. 64-6).
sale port 43. Such priorities played against La Guiara’s development as a sta-
ple supplier of cotton to Barcelona whither, as can be seen, few direct voya-
ges were undertaken. It favoured, however, La Guiara’s participation in the
international cotton market which was developing in the 1790s.
The Cartagena details are included in table 13. This shows that the port
was as exceptional in the manner it shipped its cotton —consistently large
batches, for both Cádiz and Barcelona— as it was in the scale of its pro-
duction. The two phenomena in fact, of course, went together: «mass gro-
wing» of cotton required «mass» shipping.
TABLE 13
COTTON SHIPMENTS FROM CARTAGENA, 1790S
(In lbs)
To CÁDIZ To BARCELONA
YEAR
ships av. cargo ships av. cargo
1790 5 76000 7 99000
1791 10 83500 9 65000
1793 6 95000 12 96000
1796 9 127000 11 49000
As it was principally ginned cotton which was being shipped, these bat-
ches did represent significant shares of total cargo values. Some impression
of the sums and ratios involved is provided by the breakdown in the cargo
composition of three ships which entered Cádiz from Cartagena in the cour-
se of 1796 (table 14). As can be seen, cotton was the most valuable commo-
dity carried —by far the most valuable in the case of the vessel San Antonio
y Josep—.
Cartagena and the Viceroyalty of New Granada where the Cartagena
cotton was grown, were thus distinct from the other areas supplying Spain
with cotton during the period which concerns us. The grounds for this are
several. Firstly, the Viceroyalty possessed its own, substantial cotton
industry and had possessed regions which specialized in cotton growing to
supply this. In its case, therefore, native, Spanish American cotton tradi-
tions in cotton growing were being drawn upon. Cotton was cultivated prin-
cipally in three zones of the eastern Cordillera region, the area of «tierra
templada» (warm soil) north of Bogota round the towns of San Gil and
Socorro, that of «tierra caliente» (hot soil, tropical), further north, around
San Gil and Socorro and in a wild area to the east of the Cordillera the
«Llanos» and in the hot soil hinterland of Cartagena and Santa Marta. The
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44 McFarlane (1993, pp. 50-2, 142-3).
45 BC, Junta de Comercio, leg. 51, n.º 12, ff. 7-14., report of Melchor de Guardia and Joseph
Francisco Duran to Junta General del Comercio, 13th March 1783.
46 McFarlane (1993, pp. 126-63).
river Magdalena, which flowed to the west of the eastern Cordillera, with its
outlet between Cartagena and Santa Marta, facilitated the export of the cot-
ton grown inland 44. Secondly, in contrast to some other cotton suppliers,
New Granada, and particularly these areas specializing in cotton growing
(and in weaving in the interior) were densely populated and experiencing
further rapid population growth in the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury: there was, thus, abundant, free labour for transfer into cotton cultiva-
tion, picking and ginning as the New Granada cotton staple developed.
These circumstances had enabled Cartagena to be the only, successful sup-
plier of ginned cotton on any scale since quite far back in the eighteenth
century as we have seen. The ginning problem was reported to have been
fully resolved by 1783, ginning equipment having probably been introduced
to Cartagena and Santa Marta from Barcelona 45. In addition, Cartagena,
unlike Vera Cruz and La Guiara, following the Regulation of Free Trade of
1778, came to rely more intensely on its cotton trade. As a former entrepôt
in the old, monopolistic, trading system, it was having to adjust commer-
cially to the new commercial circumstances. In addition its cacao and other
commodity trades —such as coffee, sugar and tobacco— were threatened
by the prosperity of those of Venezuela and by transport disadvantages: the
mountainous interior made the achievement of a unified market difficult
and the sea voyage from Cartagena was considerably longer than that from
La Guiara or Maracaibo. Only in cotton, for the reasons given above, did it
enjoy a comparative advantage 46.
TABLE 14
CARGOES OF 3 VESSELS ENTERING CÁDIZ FROM CARTAGENA IN 1796
(In reales)
San José San Josef San Antonio y Josep
Cotton 487440 649440 1464480
Cacao 326700 559050
Indigo 220518 99016 123120
Sugar 210376
Coffee 6250
Bullion 725310 919700 328165
total value 1826234 2369014 2437760
cotton % of total
cargo value 27 27 60
cotton % of non
bullion commodities 47 50 80
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Thus, Cartagena developed a major, staple trade in cotton and became
the essential partner in the Catalan industry’s vertical integration into cot-
ton spinning. Mass production required regular and mass supply. As we
have seen, Cartagena succeeded in providing such quantities, as demons-
trated graphically by table 15 which records cotton deliveries from
Cartagena in the course of 1796. As can be seen, cotton was being delivered
in most months, in some cases in several shipments.
TABLE 15
COTTON DELIVERIES FROM CARTAGENA 1796
(In lbs)
Ship Sailed Port Arrived cotton (lbs)
San José 13.11.95 Cádiz 8.2.96 101550
NS del Rosario 24.11.95 Barcelona 21.3.96 3600
San Josef 16.1.96 Cádiz 28.3.96 135300
NS del Carmen 10.1.96 Cádiz 30.3.96 63300
Sn Antonio 23.11.95 Barcelona 3.4.96 25542
Sn Geronimo 20.11.95 Barcelona 5.4.96 57048
Sn Antonio 4.2.96 Cádiz 10.4.96 305125
Sn Luis Gonzaga 3.2.96 Cádiz 12.4.96 81950
V. Montserrat 21.11.95 Barcelona 15.4.96 6225
Sn Bartholomé 13.11.95 Barcelona 19.4./96 11850
NS Angustias 12.2.96 Barcelona 25.6.6 63937
Sn Miquel 23.6.06 Cádiz 22.8.96 29695
Sra del Pilar 4.6.96 Cádiz 22.8.96 98700
Sn A de Padua 6.5.96 Barcelona 3.9.96 109775
Stma Trinidad 21.6.96 Cádiz 16.9.96 152900
La Fina 1.4.96 Barcelona 21.9.96 99100
La Concepción 20.5.96 Barcelona 22.9.96 2351
San Josef 8.7.96 Barcelona 24.9.96 58136
Catalina 24.7.96 Cádiz 27.10.96 170875
Total 1576659
7. FREIGHT COSTS
The freighting rates charged on San Domingo cotton exported between
1769 and 1770 were 10 reales the quintal. An «informe» of Barcelona’s Junta
de Comercio, submitted in 1775, shows that this was a higher than usual
rate and that changes in shipping practices were in process which were con-
tributing to lowering freighting rates. These had been set by the Real
Proyecto for the American trade of 1720, but the rates in force in the areas
of the empire opened to free trade in 1765 were already far lower. For exam-
ple, while the Proyecto set a rate of 50 pesos fuertes for a «pipa» (tuns) of
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47 «Los Patrones de este Principado todo lo calculan â razon de Piperia».
48 Intention of the «comisionados de esta dependencia»: he would seem to be referring to the
Junta de Comercio of Barcelona which was recommending requiring that all ships returning from
America carry a limited quantity of cotton.
49 BC, JC, leg 51, n.º 8, ff. 17-18, informe of Pablo Puiguriguer of July 10th 1775.
50 On these see Mazzaoui (1981, pp. 50-1).
wine loaded in Cádiz for Caribbean ports, free trading vessels sailing for
Havana from Barcelona were carrying this item at rates fluctuating betwe-
en 13 and 15 pesos sencillos, about a 1/4 of the official rate. The charges for
tuns were significant as they set the rates for other commodities 47. Similar,
lower freight rates applied to homebound voyages. Sugar, for example,
charged at over 10 pesos the «caixa» according to the Proyecto, was being
charged at just 5 on Catalan ships with the consequence «que ... ha cesado
enteramte la entrada en este Puerto de las Azucares de Francia ... por via de
marcella». Rates for cotton had not been set in the 1720 proyecto, but later
royal instructions had fixed them at 9 reales the arroba, 10 per cent less
than the San Domingo charge. Reductions in freighting prices had not yet
set in at the time the informe was produced. Its author, however, expressed
his view that it would be «convenient» that the rate should be set at 5 rea-
les the quintal. Such a charge he judged to be a reasonable one for four rea-
sons: the existing charge related to cargoes on ships plying the fleet-using
Cádiz route, subject to «formalidades â que no estan sugetos las embarca-
ciones del libre comercio», the intention was that each returning ship would
carry only a limited quantity of cotton only 48, the original cost of the cot-
ton was low and cotton was not prone to deterioration and consequent
damage penalties. The lower rate hoped for was consequently not judged to
be likely to be prejudicial to ship-owners («si se atiende â que es una nimie-
dad el gravamen, y mucho el beneficio que resultara â la causa publica»).
The informe, as can be seen, still reflects the prevailing belief that cotton
could only reach Spain in adequate quantities by a combination of charity
and coercion but it shows too how changing shipping practices, dictated by
the economics of freighting, were beginning to arrive at solutions from
which cotton could potentially benefit 49.
Details of freight rates charged on cotton between 1789 and 1796 are
included in table 16 below. They serve to show the degree to which freigh-
ting charges for cotton had evolved by this point in the direction anticipa-
ted by the informe. Only a small sample of freight rates are available but, as
can be seen, those charged at Cartagena had fallen steadily whereas those
for Caracas, La Guiara and Vera Cruz had remained at higher levels. The
difference must reflect degrees of competition for cargo space but supply
changes must also have been partly responsible for the change. The enor-
mous cargoes being carried from Cartagena suggest that state of the art pac-
king techniques had been introduced there 50.
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8. PRICES IN BARCELONA
In table 17 below I have added details of cotton prices paid by
Barcelona’s Royal Spinning Company between 1783 and 1795 to some pri-
ces recorded for the 1760s and 1770s. It is clear from the table that, contrary
to the impression given by discussions during the 1770s, cotton prices were
lower then than during, and after, the American war. The evidence would be
consistent with the argument that rising demand for American cotton in
Spain was the principal cause for the trade’s expansion. High prices were
sustained through the 1780s, we can see, despite the rapidly increasing
supply. There was then a significant decline in cotton prices between 1790
and 1793 as growth in the trade accelerated. The rapidly increasing cotton
supply and the commercial and freighting economies which have been refe-
rred to would account for this. Average prices recovered slightly between
1793 and 1795, but there are no speculative increases such as those which
were to occur during the war with Britain. (Levant cotton, resort to which
became necessary, was selling at between 23s 6d and 28s 4d the lb in 1799).
It can be seen that during the crucial stage of the take-off in its cotton
TABLE 16
FREIGHT RATES FOR COTTON, 1787-91
(Reales per arroba)
Cartagena La Guiara Caracas Vera Cruz
1787 8 to 10
1789 6
1790 3 to 3 2/3 10 10 to 12 11
1791 2 8 3/4 to 10
Sources: AGI, Indif., 2443, 2447, 2449.
TABLE 17
GINNED COTTON PRICES, BARCELONA
(In sous & diners)
1769 5.10 1787 11.6 - 14.3
1774 5.6 - 6.2 1788 9.4 - 11.1
1775 6.2 - 7.10 1789 8.6 - 11
1779 8.6 - 9 1790 7.6 - 9
1782 10.8 1791 6.6 - 9.10
1783 10.8 - 13.3 1792 7.1 – 8.6
1784 9.2 - 11.6 1793 8.6 - 8.9
1785 9.8 - 11 1794 8.2 - 12.8
1786 9.4 - 10.1 1795 7.11 - 10.4
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51 On these developments see Thomson (2004, pp. 249-82, and 2005, pp. 701-35).
industry —it was during the early 1790s that the new technologies diffu-
sed— Catalonia was exceptionally favoured in having at its disposition an
elastic, competitively priced supply of high quality American cotton 51.
9. CONCLUSION
Although, as noted in Sections 1 and 2, important debates have taken
place about the causes for the development of the Hispanic trade in cotton
and concerning its links with Catalan industrialization, the primary purpo-
se of this article has been purely to document the growth trajectory of the
trade as fully as possible, given the necessarily selective research of the
sources. What information has emerged concerning this trajectory?
In the pioneering years of the trade, the exporting of cotton, which was
a difficult task in itself —cotton was a bulky product of relatively low value
compared to commodities such as cochineal, coffee and sugar— was com-
plicated further by the impossibility of getting the cotton cleaned before
embarkation and deficiencies in the shipping resources of the region,
Catalonia, where the cotton was most needed. The first of these limitations
was effectively resolved in the course of the 1760s. From that point it was
clear that the labour supply situation in Catalonia was sufficiently favoura-
ble to ensure that even if the cotton arrived unginned, its cleaning could be
undertaken locally. On the other hand, although there was an area of the
Spanish empire which had the resources to provide a large and regular
supply of cotton —New Granada— its cotton was not being delivered with
sufficient regularity to ease the transition to cotton spinning in Catalonia.
In addition, plans to supplement the empire’s cotton supply by the promo-
tion of cotton plantations in the Caribbean were found to be difficult to suc-
cessfully put into practice because of the costs and technical skills involved
and, again, shortage of labour. Towards the end of the 1770s, however, the
delivery of American cotton was becoming more regular. American cotton
was in demand, and used, during the American war despite its high price.
Growing demand for raw cotton during, and after, the war, however, was
principally being met by Levantine supplies.
From 1783 the trade took off. The first stage of this effectively took the
form of import substitution by the American product for the Levantine
imports. The rapid nature of the trade’s growth suggests that economies on
both sides of the Atlantic were primed for the change. Barcelona now pos-
sessed the shipping resources for developing its own trade and its fleet of
coasting vessels ensured, too, access to supplies delivered to Cádiz. The cot-
ton growing resources of New Granada were now focused on the provisio-
ning of the peninsula. Vera Cruz’s unginned cotton came to be imported in
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extraordinary quantities, the exceptional elasticity of labour supply in
Catalonia at this stage enabling cotton ginning to be taken up as rapidly as
the parallel movements into carding, spinning and weaving. Capital was
available for financing the trade and cotton packing techniques for the lar-
ger cotton cargoes must have been introduced to the empire from the
Mediterranean where they had been first developed. The growth of an inter-
national trade in cotton represented an extra stimulus, creating an additio-
nal basis for the achievement of externalities and proving particularly help-
ful for Venezuelan cotton, whose export expanded rapidly from this point.
The war and disruption occasioned to the French plantations and cotton
trade were other catalysts for the latter success.
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